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Introduction  
The last two decades have seen a gradual rise in public concern about strategic weapons 
proliferation. Smaller nation’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, which had waned in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, is again on the rise. Not only the existence of vast surpluses of usable 
fissile material in the United States, Russia, Japan and Europe have also further intensified 
concerns over its possible leakage and theft, but the prospect of terrorist use of nuclear, chemical 
or biological munitions that was so dramatically highlighted by the Japanese subway sarin attacks 
of 1995 and London attack of July 2005 on underground tube train is also a source of continuous 
headaches. Finally, the last five years have also seen the increasing pace of space technology 
proliferation underscored by ever more advanced Chinese, North Korean, Iranian, Indian and 
Pakistani missile and satellite launches.[1] This paper initially discusses the NPT theory and then 
moves on to cases of threshold crossing. Finally it focuses on South Asia.  
NPT Theory and Nonproliferation  
There are many analysts who believe that there exists a considerable gap between theoretical 
aspects of the NPT and as it is practiced during the last almost four decades. Some scholars 
regard the ‘gap between theory and practice’ is neither true, nor necessary, nor conducive to 
good policy and good scholarship.’ The strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation have 
been debated almost since the first nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.[2] Theories can be strong or weak. Theories are considered strong if they explain a lot 
of important phenomena with relatively few input requirements, or if they make quite confident 
and precise predictions, or if the empirical record closely track the expectations of the theory.[3] 
We can make the case by considering two ongoing academic debates on proliferation: the 
Optimist—Pessimist’ debate, and the closely related ‘managing proliferation’ debate in political 
science theory. The Optimist—Pessimist debate concerns whether the spread of nuclear 
weapons leads to greater geopolitical stability because nuclear weapons are conducive to mutual 
deterrence (Optimist) or whether the spread of nuclear weapons leads to greater instability 
because the new nuclear arsenals might be more prone to accidental, unauthorized or even 
intentional use than were the superpower arsenals (Pessimism).[4]  
The debate has been conducted in academic circles for decades, and each new wave earns a 
new moniker. Pessimists are worried that new nuclear nations might be un-deterrable but 
Optimists applied the logic of rational deterrence theory to proliferation and argued that minimal 
arsenals would suffice to deter wars. In a unipolar world, an eminent scholar argues, the 
possession of nuclear deterrents by smaller nations can check the disruptive ambition of a 
reckless superpower. Perhaps that is why he consistently argued “the gradual spread of nuclear 
weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”[5] The only thing a country can do with nuclear 
weapons is to use them for deterrence purposes, which could be useful for internal stability, 
peace, and cautious behavior. 
The NPT entered into force in 1970, when expectations of the growth of both nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons were particularly high. Under the treaty, non-nuclear weapon states agree to 
give up pursuit of nuclear weapons, but not their pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The main obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states are to foreswear nuclear weapons (Article 
II), submit to IAEA safeguards inspections (Article III), and not supply certain nuclear-related 
items unless they are under safeguards (Article III). The main obligations of the nuclear weapon 
states are not to transfer or help non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons (Article 
I), not to supply certain nuclear related items unless they are under safeguards (Article III), to 
facilitate the exchange of peaceful nuclear energy technology (Article IV), and to pursue 
negotiations toward nuclear disarmament (Article VI). 
The bifurcation of states into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” has led, at times, to opposing views 
on many aspects of treaty implementation. In the area of compliance, some states would like to 
focus on whether the nuclear weapon states are complying with Articles IV (technical cooperation) 
and VI (nuclear disarmament) of the treaty. Other states would like to focus on whether the non-
nuclear weapon states are complying with Articles II (obligation not to develop or receive nuclear 
weapons) and III (safeguards). 
The NPT itself is silent on how to assess compliance, how to resolve compliance disputes, and 
what procedures to follow in the event of non-compliance. Specifically, there is no verification of 
the obligations in Articles I and II not to transfer or receive nuclear weapons.[6] The treaty 
contains no language on verification other than to require states to accept nuclear safeguards 
(Article III). The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on 
safeguards implementation every year, and sometimes on specific compliance issues at Board of 
Governors meetings. In terms of Articles IV and VI, the treaty offers no definitions or ways of 
assessing whether states are living up to their obligations. Nuclear weapon states, in the past, 
have provided information about their nuclear cooperation efforts, their contributions to the IAEA’s 
technical cooperation program, and descriptions of their efforts toward nuclear disarmament. At 
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed to what have become known as the “13 
Practical Steps” toward disarmament, but the United States has since withdrawn its support for 
those steps.[7] NPT member states sought further clarification of obligations in Articles IV and VI 
at the May 2005 Review Conference but this Conference ended without resolving the question.  
Nations acquire nuclear weapons not to menace their neighbors but to protect themselves. For 
the governments of North Korea and Iran, the primary threat was and is the United States. Now 
the question rises “If you were making decisions for North Korea or Iran, wouldn't you be 
extremely determined to get nuclear weapons, given American capability and American policy?” It 
would not be out of order that the United States worries as much about being deterred as well as 
attacked. For example the North Korean had already acquired technology to deliver warhead to 
U.S. homeland. 
One option for the United States would be to play down the importance of nuclear weapons. 
Washington's deep and vocal concern over proliferation only enhances the perceived value of 
such weapons. Ultimately, however, no amount of military might allows a country to wish away 
the Bomb. Whether or not nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous place, they 
certainly make it a more humbling one, and their spread only narrows the options of the world's 
sole superpower.  
Crossing the Nuclear Threshold  
Over the years the NPT regime, by and large, effectively worked until recent times. Recently the 
spread of nuclear weapons seems to have taken on what might appear to be a wildfire-like quality. 
North Korea had already declared itself a nuclear power. However, it needs to be mentioned here 
that it has once again agreed during the last several months to abandon its quest for nuclear 
weapons in return for economic assistance.[8] Given the past history nobody is sure that history 
will not repeat itself. Iran is engaged in negotiations to convince United States and Europe that it 
has no secret weapons program of its own similar to those of the Indians and the Pakistanis as 
both were working in their active and reactive moulds.[9] The GCC has also decided that the 
members would set up nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes. Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have declared their intentions to develop civilian 
nuclear technologies ostensibly for water desalination plants. Each could kick off a regional arms 
race. North Korea in the past has sold nuclear technology to Libya as well, while Iran is alleged to 
be sponsoring Hezbollah and Hamas. If the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the backbone of 
nonproliferation efforts for the past 35 years, comes up for review, there will be an increasing 
sense that it is failing. 
Although heads of state, legislators, intelligence officials, and opinion columnists are nearly united 
in their deep concern over the world's nuclearization, the scholars who spend their time thinking 
about the issue are in fact deeply divided over the consequences of the spread of nuclear 
weapons, even to so-called ''states of concern.'' 
The problem of ''loose nukes'' relates to Russia's inability in the years since the Cold War to keep 
track of all its nuclear materials. This shows that even a country's strong interest in maintaining 
control of its nuclear weapons is no guarantee that some won't fall into the wrong hands, raising 
the threat of nuclear terrorism. Increasing pressure on nuclear states because of nuclear 
terrorism had also created mistrust for the proliferation theory. These mistrusts gave birth to new 
invisible questions, e.g., Do nuclear states like the United States oppose proliferation simply out 
of concern for their citizens' safety, or is there something more strategic at work. 
Weapons as Bargaining Chips 
Weak states that worry about U.S. power projection capabilities, like Libya, might cash in their 
chips.  But Libya is not exactly a role model for the international community.  More likely, states 
that seek the deadliest, indiscriminate weapons for reasons that may or may not have to do with 
the United States will continue to do so.  Options will remain open, while surreptitious advances 
will continue.  In the absence of concerted efforts to strengthen treaties from within, external 
“fixes” will be compensatory, and not systemic.  The net effect of denigrating treaties while 
seeking to compensate for their weaknesses through coercive measures is likely to be weaker 
norms and weaker compliance.   
Just as a “combined arms” approach increases the likelihood of success on the battlefield, a 
“combined efforts” approach is needed to strengthen treaty regimes designed to rid the world of 
the most deadly weapons.   The use of force is not widely applicable to proliferation threats, and 
the pursuit of unfettered dominance corrodes rather than builds international cooperation.  The 
application of power projection may well be necessary, but it usually generates more terrorist 
threats than it foils.  It also places heavy burdens on the U.S. armed forces.  The more the 
strategic concept of dominance is actually demonstrated, the more it exhausts or alienates the 
countries waging, receiving, and observing its effects.  A more balanced approach is needed, but 
is unlikely as long as the value of diplomacy, alliances, treaty regimes, and verification are 
denigrated.  
The NPT is now in serious trouble. Washington’s interest in treaties has declined with the demise 
of the Soviet Union. The treaty ending nuclear tests that the Gilpatric Committee envisioned was 
finally negotiated in 1996, but it remains in limbo after the U.S. Senate rejected it.  India and 
Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and within three months, tough international sanctions 
began to erode.  Then North Korea broke an eight-year moratorium on testing.  Proliferation 
concerns grew more intense with revelations of underground networks of nuclear commerce and 
the specter of nuclear terrorism. An ill-conceived and poorly executed war to prevent Saddam 
Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction weakened Washington’s ability to respond 
to the accelerated nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.  Proliferation seems to have 
become a lot easier in a uni-polar world than during the Cold War, when the two superpowers 
acted in concert to keep potential proliferators in line.[10]  
Principle Opponent vs. U.S. Monopoly  
In September 1998, the United States had refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; 
it also withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, and in 2002, conceived the Nuclear Posture Review 
policy to prepare itself for a pre-emptive doctrine with the tactical nuclear weapons, including 
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators (RNEPs). This U.S. policy, according to a well-known 
American Scholar (George Perkovich), is “destined to reduce international cooperation in 
enforcing nonproliferation commitments rather than enhance it.”[11] In addition, in May 2003, the 
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee too lifted the ban on the Spratt-Furse Amendments to 
develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).[12] Reportedly, since November 2003, the United 
States has started research and development work on the RNEPs and the TNWs, while, the de 
jure NWS have also not implemented one of the “13 practical steps” envisaged in the 2002 NPT 
Review Conference to achieve nuclear disarmament.[13] This obviously has given the United 
States an “offensive deterrence” capability as conceived in its National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy, in clear contravention to the basic nonproliferation ideals 
of the NPT.[14] 
The Bush administration has fought a preventive war against Iraq to seize its weapons of mass 
destruction that have yet to be found and may not exist.  Meanwhile, the Iranian and North 
Korean nuclear programs have proceeded ahead, unimpeded by U.S. diplomacy or military 
options, which have shrunk greatly with the passage of time and as a consequence of the 
administration’s decision to focus on Iraq.  
The recent Indo–U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal has also created further complications and problems in 
the ongoing process of NPT. Not only the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal has irreparably damaged the 
existing NPT regime but has also provided incentives to aspiring nations to go nuclear by making 
India as an exception through this deal. The deal has indirectly extended recognition to India’s 
nuclear weapon program by stressing that the deal clearly is applicable only to civilian nuclear 
program and does not cover its military program. By dividing Indian nuclear program into civilian 
and military, it agreed to have 16 of Indian nuclear reactors placed under the IAEA safeguards 
and allowed the 8 military reactors to continue working as they were prior to the deal. Implicitly 
the deal extended the much desired recognition to India as a nuclear weapon state. 
Besides, the deal will have far reaching repercussions on regional and global security 
environment. It is a violation of U.S. Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty laws, which exist between a 
nuclear power and another, that has pursued nuclearization outside the ambit of the IAEA. This 
was the reason why India faced sanctions after the May 1998 nuclear tests. 
These facts are irrefutable.  This side of the U.S. administration’s balance sheet weighs very 
heavily against America’s hopes for a safer world.  Since the dawn of nuclear diplomacy, no U.S. 
President has compiled a more negative record, or done more to obstruct multilateral efforts to 
reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction than the incumbent U.S. administration.  
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was deemed to be a far more urgent matter than stopping the 
North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs.  Since January 2003, when Pyongyang announced 
its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there have only been three short rounds 
consisting of 100 hours of multilateral talks designed to stop and reverse the North Korean 
nuclear program.  Surely, this threat deserved a higher priority, but the Bush administration did 
not formulate and present concrete suggestions in this regard until June 2004—eighteen months 
after Pyongyang announced its intentions to resume reprocessing of Plutonium.  U.S. 
negotiations and pressure on Tehran to stop its nuclear programme is yet to be finalized. 
It’s hard to round up help to stop proliferation when the dominant power demands strict 
compliance of others while rewarding friends and demanding maximum flexibility for itself and 
also holding verification arrangements in low esteem.  If the United States deems it essential to 
adopt a neutral approach to treaties and norms, others are bound to be guided by their interests 
and would accordingly formulate policies. The infrastructure of nonproliferation was built during 
the Cold War, and is performing at less than a satisfactory level during current period of U.S. 
military dominance.  Successful efforts to stop and reverse proliferation face many odds when the 
world’s most powerful country doesn’t think highly of treaties and verification.  These odds 
become even more difficult to overcome when veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council 
like China, Russia and France fail to come to the defense of the treaty.  
In the operative international political system the United States is regarded as the world’s 
trendsetter, and at present, the trends for nonproliferation are not very attractive. Dominant U.S. 
military power is not the primary reason for this state of affairs while there are others who also 
contributed.   However, dominant U.S. military power can’t compensate for unwise policies, nor is 
it sufficient for collective security or unilateral enforcement.  Military power can’t convince others 
to adhere to the norms or obligations that Washington itself refuses to accept. 
If relaxing the rules of nuclear commerce to help India contributes to a new nuclear future that 
raises barriers against proliferation, then these changes are worth supporting.  If, instead, the 
new rules are likely to result in more proliferation, the deal is contrary to U.S. national security 
interests.  Therefore the central question the U.S. Congress should have considered whether this 
deal is good or bad for proliferation. But it seems not many considerations were given to this 
aspect.     
Nuclear South Asian and Nonproliferation  
The NPT was designed to avoid precisely dangerous nuclear situations. It was based on the 
notion that it was in the interest of all countries to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. One had to 
draw the line somewhere, even if it was arbitrary. Such line drawing implied a degree of 
‘unfairness’, but this was not, however, to last indefinitely. Under the treaty, the five approved 
nuclear states agreed not only to eliminate their nuclear arms over the course of time, but also to 
provide non-nuclear states with assistance in the development of nuclear programs for peaceful 
purposes. Non-nuclear member states agreed not to pursue military, nuclear programs.[15]  
Since 1974, Pakistan has been consistently offering India different proposals to establish a 
nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, if not to completely realize the goal of nuclear 
disarmament. This, of course, strengthened Islamabad’s nonproliferation credentials. The delicate 
conventional balance between India and Pakistan received a serious setback in May 1974, when 
India conducted its first nuclear test. One observer stressed, “If mutual suspicion and the security 
dilemma thus constitute the basic underlying condition in a system of separate, independent 
power units, one would assume that history must consist of one continual race for power and 
armaments, an unadulterated rush into unending wars, indeed, a chain of ‘preventive wars.’”[16] 
This is probably true for the South Asian situation where “serious misperceptions, 
miscalculations” is quite high.[17]  
Different Pakistani government had floated the idea of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone (NWFZ) since 1974 somewhat regularly. India not only opposed these proposals but 
also even refused to talk to Pakistan on the subject. In addition to the NWFZ concept, Pakistan 
had too floated other proposals in various national and international platforms with a view to 
check the horizontal nuclear proliferation from India and Pakistan to the other NNWS.[18]  
1. Some of these proposals were: Setting up of a NWFZ, in 1974. Pakistan repeated the 
NWFZ proposals to India in 1976, 1987, 1990, and on May 4, 2003.  
2. Pakistan asked India to jointly sign the NPT and bilateral/joint agreements to full-scope 
safeguards or inspections, in Nov-Dec 1984, June 1985, and July 1987. India rejected all 
these overtures and continued to call for a universal general and complete nuclear 
disarmament and non-discriminatory NPT.  
3. Renunciation of acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, in 1978.  
4. Accession by both India and Pakistan to the NPT, in 1979.  
5. Bilateral acceptance of full IAEA safeguards, in 1979.  
6. A mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities, in 1979.  
7. In 1981, Pakistan offered a No War Pact to India that was not accepted by New Delhi.  
8. Bilateral signing of a treaty banning all types of nuclear tests, in 1987.[19]  
9. Pakistan proposed to India not to manufacture and to explode nuclear weapons, in 1987 
and 1991. India did not reply to Pakistan’s proposals.  
10. Convening of a conference on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, which 
should be attended by Russia, United States, China, India and Pakistan, in1992.  
11. An idea of South Asian Zero-Missile Zone was again suggested in 1994.  
On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD to the non-state actors and terrorist groups.[20] Pakistan’s Ambassador to 
the UN, Munir Akram, during deliberations on the issue reiterated that: 
Historically, the proliferation of WMD had occurred when states sought to obtain them. 
But non-state actors had often been the instruments used for proliferation by states 
seeking WMD. Recently, Pakistan had dismantled such a proliferation network involving 
its own nationals and others… Pakistan, a nuclear weapon state, had established 
effective command and control of its assets, sites and materials. [21]  
The Pakistani envoy also rightly apprehended that the Resolution might overpower the national 
legislatures. “The concerns that arose from the Resolution were with regard to the role of the 
Security Council, to the ability of the Security Council to legislate for other states, and the fear 
that the Council wished to impose measures on states that they had not freely accepted.” Munir 
Akram had further dilated that Pakistan would, not accept any demand for access, much less 
inspections, of our nuclear and strategic assets, materials and facilities.”[22] 
It needs to be stressed here that Pakistan is abiding by the international rules and obligations in 
respect of transfer of nuclear technology to NNWS, nuclear safeguards and export controls. In 
this connection Pakistan has passed legislation prescribing stringent control measures and 
severe punishment for any one involved in transferring/smuggling nuclear material component 
from the country. In addition to it Pakistan:  
• Stands firmly committed to nuclear nonproliferation and checking the spread of WMD  
• Has put in place the most effective and elaborate export control mechanism on nuclear 
materials, component and technology  
• Has established Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority  
• Pakistan is also a party to Chemical weapons Convention  
• Declared unilateral moratorium on further testing of nuclear devices  
• Supports Complete and General Disarmament  
Conclusion 
Five key factors can cause a country’s reversal of nuclear policy and influence the decision 
makers to opt for the acquisition of hitherto forbidden nuclear weapons. These include the major 
shift in most powerful nations' (United States) foreign and security policy, a breakdown of the 
global nonproliferation regime, domestic imperatives, erosion of global and regional security, and 
increasing availability of technology.[23] A close examination of those states that have already 
acquired nuclear weapons and those which are engaged in the acquisition of dreaded arsenal 
clearly reveals that one of the above mentioned factors was operative and heavily influenced the 
decision makers of particular country. Besides, the discriminatory nature of policy pursuits of 
certain countries or of a system further paved the grounds for the acquisition of nuclear weapon 
capability. 
It is somewhat intriguing to know that similar mistakes are being repeated in some manner. 
Instead of seeking a way how to accommodate three known nuclear powers India, Pakistan and 
Israel, the efforts during the Cold Wart era were focused to deny them their status. Indeed this 
was unrealistic to think that India, Pakistan and Israel would eliminate their weapons. Similarly the 
recent Indo–U.S. deal has reflected not only utter disregard for Pakistani efforts to plug all future 
illegal nuclear commerce but has also reflected the discriminatory policy pursuits. 
While the NPT review conference is held after the passage of every five years, it is some what 
unfortunate that efforts had not been directed to find a way to bring them into the NPT regime but 
focused on marginalizing them. India, Pakistan, Israel could have been made associate members 
of NPT accepting obligations under Articles I, III, VI. In return NSG particularly NWS (P5) could 
have signed a protocol with them for cooperation in the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 
Not only the discriminatory nature of the NPT system reflected the unrealistic pursuits but the 
recent Indo–U.S. civilian nuclear deal also reflects its discriminatory nature. Under the agreement 
the United States is going to make efforts to influence NSG for nuclear commerce in order to 
facilitate supplies to a non-NPT India.  
The nonproliferation theory is currently being viewed as unstable and is in danger of losing its real 
potential.  It was drafted in an earlier Cold War era, before the advent of a single dominant 
military power but now the world has undergone a complete transformation. Not only the 
underground networks for nuclear commerce and terrorist cells seeking nuclear weapons and 
fissile material are active but also the great powers that were once ardent supporters of NPT 
regime have lost interests.  In recent times North Korea had undermined its efficacy by openly 
building nuclear weapons and in many ways it also became a source of encouragement for  Iran 
to continue working on its nuclear program- both may have been influenced by domestic 
imperatives as well as the policies of the United States. It appears that the United States has lost 
interest in key parts of the nonproliferation agenda, while Russia and China sometimes act as if 
proliferation isn’t all that great a concern.  On top of this, the Bush administration’s efforts to relax 
the rules of nuclear commerce to help India, risks an invitation to the damaging operative 
constraints against proliferation. The structural weaknesses of the nonproliferation system go 
back to its creation. The inability of the NPT regime to have the initial pledge of the nuclear 
weapon states to get rid of their weapons not only reflected its weakness but even newcomers to 
the nuclear club also used this excuse.  
The game was perhaps more manageable when there were two major nuclear superpowers (U.S. 
and S.U./Russia) demonstrated common interest in preventing proliferation. Both superpowers 
supported the two most cherished goals of abstainers—verifiable treaties to end nuclear weapon 
tests and to end the production of fissile material for bombs. This ground shifted with the demise 
of the Soviet Union.  In a world of U.S. military dominance and unchallenged nuclear superiority, 
Washington’s priorities changed.  The Senate rejected the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests 
for all time.  Treaties and verification became old hat.  After 9/11, muscular “counter-proliferation” 
took center stage.   The Bush administration adopted a “good guys/bad guys” approach to 
nonproliferation.  It now seeks one set of rules for responsible or friendly states, and another for 
evildoers. 
The American policies are fast eroding the very rationale of the NPT restraint regime and making 
the world far more dangerous place than what was the situation the situation during the Cold war 
days. Whatever one may say there existed some kind of nuclear order during the Cold War 
whereas in the post Cold War and post 9/11, as some would say, that the nuclear order is rapidly 
transforming itself into nuclear disorder.  
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